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Two types of implicit argument.
Implicit arguments come in at least two distinct types. The claims of this paper should be understood as app lying to only one of these types, specifical l y, to EXISTEN'I1AlLY QUANIlFIE D implicit arguments. No cla.im is made about the separate category of D EICTIC implicit arguments.
A few examples should make the distinction clear. Perhaps the best known and most studied example of an implicit argument is the implicit agent of a short passi ve, as in (1):
(1)
John was kill ed.
Here, the agent of the killin g is left unmentioned, but we know that if John was killed, there had to be someone or something that kill ed him. Moreover, the agent is systematicall y expressed in related constructions like the long pass ive in (2) and the active in (3):
(2) John was killed by someone or something.
(3)
Someone or something killed John .
• Thanks to Barry Scbein. whose correspondence on the issues discussed in this paper helped improve it coasiderably. (I'hjs is not to say that he agrees with the uguments given here. of course.) Remaining errors are my own.
It is somewhat of a fudge to call the implict argument here an AGENT. since John could have been kill ed by something with no agentivity at all , such as a fallin g branch; but it is convenient to use this label anyway t and I will do so throughout this paper.
With few exceptions, the implicit agent of a short passi ve is interpreted as existential l y quantified. 1 That is, a short passi ve sentence is interpreted as though there were a variable in the argument place of the implicit agent, bound by an existential quantifier. For example, sentence (1) is interpreted essential ly as in (4): (4) ax kiU(x, J)
The sentence is true DO matter who or what kill ed Jobo, as long as so:mething did; the implicit argument does not refer to a particular individual , but instead is existentiall y quantified.
We have a similar interpretati on for the implicit object argument of the detransitivized version of the verb eat. as in (5): (5) John ate.
In this case the interpretati on is like that of the formula in (6). once again with an existential quantifier:
At; 10Dg as John ate SOMETHJNG, the sentence is true; the implicit argument does not refer to a particular thing, but instead is like a variable bound by an existential quantifier. We should distinguish this sort of implicit argument from implicit arguments which receive a DPlcrJC interpretation. At; an example, consider the implicit than argument in a comparative constnlction.. as ill ustrated in
lin a few odd cases, the implicit agent of a short passive seems to be interpreted deicticaUy rather than existeatiaUy. For example, seDlcllCe (i) seems bett er paraphrased as (ii) than as (w) ;
The traps were avoided.
(ii)
The pragmatical1y relevant individual(s) avoided the traps.
(Ui )
There is someone or something that avoided the traps.
No explanation of this fa ct will be offered here, although the questions such examples raise are fa scinating.
( 7) John is stronger.
Sentence (7) doesD:t just mean that there is SOMETHING that John is stronger than -in this case it would be almost trivially true. Instead, it means that John is stronger than some pmgmatically cJetermmed individual or measure of stnmgth. For examplet in some contexts it might mean that John is stronger than Bill ; in other contexts it might mean that he is stronger than his own previous level of strength; but in any case it does not have a meaning like the formula in (8):
Likewise, the implicit location argument of a verb like arri ve does Dot receive an existential interpretati on. Sentence (9), for example, means that John arri ved at the pragmaticall y relevant location; it doesn't just mean that he arri ved somewhere, as in the formula in (10):
John arri ved.
(10) 31 arri l'e(i, 1)
I will have nothing to say in this paper about "why some implicit arguments are interpreted one way and others are interpreted differently, although this is a very interesting question. The distinction between deictic and existential implicit arguments will be of importance mainly in that the problems outlined below arise ODly in connecti on with existential l y quantified implicit arguments, and Dot in coonecti on with deicticall y interpreted implicit arguments. We will set deictically interpreted implicit arguments aside and concern ourselves only with existentiall y quantified implicit arguments.
Two analyses of implicit arguments.
How can a formal malysis give the effect of an existentially quantified implicit argument? The most venerable app roach is probably a syntactic ODe: The implicit argument is taken to be an actual noun phrase, semantically equivalent to someone or something. To explain why we can't hear this noun phrase when someone utters John was killed or John ale, we claim either that the noun phrase is phonologically empty . or else that it is present only at some more abstract level of representati on. An alternative approach is to deny that implicit arguments appear as separate constituents in the syntax at all. Instead. the existential quantifica-tion associated with implicit arguments is taken to form part of the internal semantics of the predicate itself. We understand the passi ve form. of a verb to be a different predicate from the active form; likewise, detrans:i tive fo rms are different predicates from their transitive counterparts. We can then give a rule like (ll), defining the passi ve form of a verb in terms of its active counterpart, or a nde like (12). defining a detransitivized verb in terms of its tnmsitive counterpart:
(11) If a is a verb t:ranslatiD g as a', md a pas is the pass ive fo rm of a, then � trans1ates as Ay3.m ' (x, y).
(12) If a is a verb tDDslating as a', aDd a cleuaDs is the detransitivized form of a, then a detrlms translates as �'(x, y) .
Rules essen tially like these can be found in Bach (1980) or Dowty (1982) , for example.
The usual arpmeDt for adopting this kind of analysis is that it explains why existentiall y quantified implicit arguments must take narro w scope with respect to overt quantifiers in the sentence.
Normally, a noun phrase expressin g existential quantification may take wide or narro w scope; so sentence (13), for example, seems to have a wide-scope reading which requires that everyone was killed by the same person, in add ition to a narro w scope reading which allows different killers for the different victims.
(13) Everyone was killed by a crazy guy with a gun.
Of course it is possi ble to deny that there is an ambiguity here, since the first reading is a special case of the second, but we may set this issue aside; the point is not that the wide scope reading exists, but that even if it does exist, it is NOT available for existentially quantified implicit arguments. So even if (13) has a reading like (14), sentence (IS) does not. This can only mean something like (16), with narr ow scope for the existential quantifier. Given a rule like (11) or (12) and some very basic assump tions about com positiooality , the existential quantifier will never take wide scope over a quantifier which forms an independent syntactic element from the predicate, and so we explain something that see ms rather mysterious on the assumption that implicit arguments are actual noun phrases.
Distributivity.
Despite their advantages, rules like (11) and (12) tum out to be problematic.
To see the problems, we must first consider a differen t kind of example, not involving implicit arguments, but something rather d.ifferent. , namely overt distributive arguments. We will return to implicit arguments in Section 4.
When a plural noun phrase serves as an argument to a predicate, the question arises as to whether this argument is to be int erp reted COu..£CTIVEL Y or DJSTR.IBUTIVEL Y • In the case of a collective intepretati on, the predicate holds of the group denoted by the noun phrase, CODSidered as a whole; it need not hold of the individual members of the group. In the case of a distributive interpretati on, however, there is an entailment that the predicate holds of the individual members of the group. For example, sentence (17) meaDS that each individual c:hild was asleep, or at least enough of them that any exceptions are pragmaticall y disregardable. In contrast, sentence (18), which receives a collective interpretati on, does not mean that each individual child is numerous, but rather that the entire group of children, considered as a whole, has the property of being numerous: 2 '
(17) The children are asleep.
(18) The children are numerous.
How can we acco unt for this difference in interpretatiOD between (17) and (18)? It obviously has something to do with a difference in meaning between numerous and asleep , so it makes sense to accoun t for it in the lexical semantics of these adj ectives, for example through the use of a meaning postulate like the one in (19):
According to this postulate , a group of individuals is asleep if and only if each of the individual members of the group is asleep. We assume such a postulate for asleep t but not for numerO lLS, and this acco unts for the relevant difference between the two predicates.
Before proceedin g I would like to address three potential objections to the use of meaning postulates like (19). First, SOme people may find it 2Probably a distributive interpretation is available in principle for sentence (18) as we l l, but it is ooascnsical. and will not be considered as a possi ble iatepretation for an actual utterance of the sentence except in the most unusual contex:ts.
objectionable to suppose that the quantification over members of the group here is UNIVERSAL quantification. After all, one can use a sentence like (17) even if one or two cbildren are still awake, especiall y if the total number of children is Jarge and it is Dot pragmatic:all y relevant whether every last child is asleep. So perhaps what we need is a near-universal quantifier instead of a universal one.
It will hardly matter for the purposes at hand if the quantification does tum out to be near-universal instead of universal; the relevant problems will come up in either case. Even so, it is perhaps worth citing an argument &om Krach (1974, pp. 190-192) that there is 1IIIi versal quantification in this sort of example: Seo.te.nces like (20) S01IIld distinctly contIadictory, and in this respect differ from conespoading serrteaces like (21), where near universal quantification is made explicit.
(2O) ?? Although the children are asleep, some of them are awake. Examples like these suggest that lexical distributivity really does involve universal quantification, and that to the extent that a sentence like (17) allows fo r some children to be awake , it is because in some circumstances these exceptions become pragmatically irre levant, and not because the truth conditions make explicit allowance fo r such exceptions. 3 A second possi ble objection to meaning postulates like (19) is that meaning postulates are incapable of handling examples which show an ambiguity between collective and distributive interpretati oos. Roberts (1987) has given well-known arguments against the use of meaning postulates to acco unt for the distributive reading of ambiguious sentences like (22) 
AlI the children are asleep .
Presumably, we · must claim that aU the differs from the in how much pragmatic disregardabiliry it can tolerate. I bave no idea how to fo nnali2;c the difference. but see Dowty (1986) for discussion of related issues.
together. Hoeksema (1983) suggested an analysis of this ambiguity in terms of "'optional meaning postulates, '" an idea which is very hard to make any sense of; Roberts (1987) and Link (1987) suggested the distributivity was due instead to an implicit, adverb-like operator on the predicate, an idea which is conceptually much less problematic. I certai:nl y agree that meaning postulates are DOt the way to acco unt for the distributive reading of ambiguous examples lik:e (22). But in cases where there is DO ambiguity, where the distributive reading is actuall y :FOR.CED by the appearan ce of a particular predicate, the lexical semantics of the predicate seems to be precisely the riaht place to accoun t for the dis tributivity. Meaning postulates are a convenient way to describe lexical meaning.
In examples exhibiting an ambiguity between a collective reading and a distributive reading, we may fo llow I...iDk and Roberts and assume that the distributive reading is due to an operator on the predicate, essen tiall y as in 
(y)]
In examples where there is DO ambiguity, and a distributive reading is due to the appearan ce of a particular predicate, we will assume that the distributivity is a result of the lexical meaning of the predicate itself rather than a separate operator, and will acco unt for that distributivity through the use of a meaning postulate similar to that in (19).
A third objection was raised by James Higginbotham. 4 By using meauing postulates in this way, we apparen tly make a prediction that negation must always take scope over the universal quantifier which forms part of the lexical meanin.g of the predicate. Thus, a sentence like (24) must have a meaning essential l y like the formula in (25):
If, for example , the maj ority of children are asleep, but one or two exceptional children are awake, sentence (24) is predicted . to be true. However it is DOt immediately clear that a small Dumber of exceptionall y awake children is really enough to make (24) automatically true. Instead, 4ln the question period after the talk.
in many contexts, (24) see ms to imply that all or nearly all the children are awake.
I would suggest that sentences like (24) are actuall y ambiguous. We can obtain the apparen tly problematic reading by app lying the distributivity operator to a predicate formed by lambda-abstracting across negation, as in (26):
In addi tion to this readinS, I thiDlc: that (24) does have a reading which is accurately rendered by (25) . Suppose that John 8Ild Mary have a policy of never discussing their cbildraJ. unless they are asleep. One eveoiDg, they send the children upstairs to bed. After a while, Mary starts to discuss the children's recent behavior. At that very moJDeD1, they hear some noise comiDg from upstairs. In this situation, I think John could reasonably and ttuthfuII y say "Wait, the children ateJllOt asleep, lOt even though it may just be a single child who is awake.
Having met these three objections to (19), let us tum to the question of how to generalize this sort of app roach to other predicates. The meaning postulate in (19) is of the general form in (21), and we might actually DEFINE distributivity in such a way that a predicate a is distributive if and only if it satisfies (27): .
(27) a(X) .. vyEX a(y) However, (27) only deals with one-p1ace predicates. We must also concern ourselves with multi-p1ace predicates, and acco unt for distributivity in these cases as well.
A multi-p1ace predicate can be distributive in one argument place without being distributive in its other argument places. For example the verb kill is poten tiall y collective in its subject argument, but it is always distributive in its object argument: you can't kill a group of individuals without killin g the individuals themselves. Therefore, we need a notion of DlSTRJBlJTMIY RELAnvE TO A PARTICULAR. ARGUMENT PLACE, rather than simply classi fying whole predicates as as either distributive or collective. A first stab at defining this notion might look something like (28):
(2 8) a is distributive in its ,� argument place iff whenever .xi is plural:
That is, a group can stand in the ;th argument place of a predicate Q if and only if each of its individual members stands in that same argument place.
A problem with smpe.
The definition in (28) seems like a :natural exteasiOIl of (27) . However, it leads to problematic results when combined with either of the two theories of implicit arguments outlined in Section 2, above. Consider sentence (29):
(29) The soldiers were kill ed.
According to the rule for intetpretin g passiv es in (11), this sentence should get a translati on into logical notation like (30). An analysis in which implicit arguments are actual noun phrases will presumably yield an equivalent representation:
But then, given that kill is distributive in its second argument place, (28) will make this equivalent to (3 1):
This seems wrong, since it requires the same kill er for all the soldiers; it does not all ow for the possi bility that the different soldiers were kill ed only by differen t agents. What we want is something more like (32), with the existential quantifier inside the scope of the universal:
The source of the problem here is that the existential quantifier comes from the rule in (11), which effectively just attaches it to the froat of the predicate, even while the predicate itself bas a kind of internal universal quantifier associ ated with its distributive argument place. As long as the role for interpretin g pass ives takes the predicate as its input. and attac hes an existential quantifier in front of the predicate, this problem apparently must result. This is the case whether we use the actual role in (11) or instead take the implicit argument as an independent noun phrase; neither approach has any way of giving the existential quantifier "super-uarro w" scope inside the internal. lexical semantics of the predicate, which is what appears to be called fo r.
There are various ways we might try to solve this problem. The solution I would like to advocate will be presented in Section 5. In the remainder of the curren t section, I would like to consider an alternative that was suggested by Barry Schein (personal COJDJDUD.i cation). Schein As Schein puts it, .... the formula is more complex than the underlying intuition. " The effect of (33) is best understood by example: acco rding to (33), a sentence like (34) will be true if and ODly if each soldier was kill ed by some subset of the guerillas , and each guerilla was a member of some group that killed at least one soldier, as in (35): (34) The guerillas killed the soldiers.
Pelbaps we could quibble with the details here -fo r instance with the requirement that each guerilla has to be a member of some group that kills at least one soldier; but such quibbles would be beside the point. The crucial fact is that a rule like (33) allows us to .. gather up" the individuals that stand in a relation to the members of some group, and say that these gathered-up individuals collectively stand in that same relation to the other group as a whole . For example we might gather up the individuals that killed solider I, the individuals that kill ed soldier 2, the individuals that killed soldier 3, and so on, and say that this group of gathered-up individuals killed .. the soldiers. " The basic idea idea here is not new; although to my knowledge no one has previously suggested a precise equivalent to (33)� interesting comparisons can be made to Lange.ndoen (1978) and Scha (198 1).
A rule like (33) works well for predicates like IdU. Unfortunately, it will not work as a general definition of distn"b utivity. Other predicates tum out to be problematic. Consider the verb know, for instance, as in to know a song. This verb is distributive in its obj ect argument place; you can't know some songs unless you know the iDdividual songs themselves. However, know does not allow, as a matt er of general principle, the kind of "gathering up" in subject position that we saw with IdU. Consider the following context John is organizing a children's pageant, in which a group of children are supposed to perform various songs. Some of the children may know some of the songs. and others of the children may know others of the songs, and stiIl more of the children may know the rest -so that every song is known by at least some of the children; but unless all the children know all the songs they are supposed to, at least to the point where exceptions become pragmaticall y irre levant, John cannot truthfully assert (36):
(36) The children know the songs.
One cann ot, as a matt er of general principle, free ly gather up the individuals that know subsets of the songs, put them all in a group� and say of that group that it knows the songs. Hence (33) is not an accurate characteriza tion of the semantics of distributive predicates in general.
Without (33), agendess passi ves retain their problematic status. Although (36) is false in the context described, it does still seem true in that context that every song IS KNOWN, even if not by the right people , so the agentless pass ive sentence (37) is true:
(37) The songs are known.
In contrast, the fo rmula in (38) (if. (30» may still be false; the songs may be known even if there is no x such that x knows (all) the songs:
We may conclude that (38) is an inadequate representation of the truth conditions of (37), hence that a pass ive rule like (1 1) is also incorrect, since it produces exactly this fo rmula. Once again� the problem is that the passive rule gives the existential quantifier assoc iated with the implicit agent automatic wide scope over any quantifiers which form part of the internal, lexical semantics of the predicate, including any quantifiers assoc iated with distributive argument places.
Schein suggests that a defender of (33) might meet these objections by claiming that in (36) . the noun phrase the songs may be intepreted contextuall y as the songs they were supposed to. In addi tion. the verb phrase is modified by a I)..opemtor (see (23», so that the subj ect is inteIpreted. distributively. In this case, the sentence means that each child knows the songs he or she is supposed to. Since Jaww is distributive in its obj ect argument, this means that each child knows EACH of the songs he or she is supposed to, which is more-or-Iess what (36) reall y means.
However, we still eDCOUDter some problems. Suppose that the songs involve fairly complex choral ammgema ats where the different children. sing diffen: :D t parts, even of a given song. In this case, (36) can be true even if no child actuall y kaows a whole song, as IODg as they each know their parts. Should we now claim that the songs may be contex tuall y interpreted as those portions of the songs they ore suppos ed to? In my opiDion, this would go just too far in all owing a contextual effect on the compositional semantics of the noun phrase; we are no longer just restricting the class of songs which we quantify over, but instead are completely reinterpretin g the sense of the noun phrase.
To conclude: Trying to maintain that the existential quantifier assoc iated with implicit arguments reall y does have wide scope .relative to the universal quantifier from distributive arguments is not a very attIac tive, or perhaps even tenable, position. What we should look for is some way of obtaining narro w scope.
S. Implicit arguments in an eveot-based theory of thematic roles.
If we assume that implicit arguments are independent noun phrases, or if we use rules like ( 11) or (12), it is very difficult to see how we could obtain suffi ciently nanow scope for implicit arguments. However, narro w scope fal ls out almost automaticall y in the third maj or way (that I know of) for analyzing implicit arguments. This third way involves what is sometimes called a "neo--DavidsoDian'lt S decomposition of verbs into an event predicate and a series of thematic relations, as in (39):
The idea is that the verb has a conespondiD.g one-place predicate of events; the subject and object of the verb are related to these events via thematic roles, which are taken to be two-place relations between an event and its participants. The evart argidDllmt is normall y required to be an existentiall y bound variable, so that senten<::e (40) , for example, will teceive the logical tnmslation in (41) Neo-Davidsoaian is from Dowty (1989) . The format of (39) follow s suuestioas of Parsons (1980 Parsons ( , 1985 Parsons ( , 1990 �e variable X bere (and throughout) should be understood as ranging over groups -which, fo r the sake of simplicity, we may take to be sets of cardinality 2 or greater.
has a smaller subevent e ' as a part, which is also an a event , in which y bears 6. , For example, IdU is distributive with respect to its patient role, so in any event where the soldiers are kill ed, there will be for each soldier, a subevent where that soldier was kill ed. Of course this should not be taken to mean that the soldiers were kill ed separatel y, or anything of the sort; even if all the soldiers were kill ed by a single bomb, for example, we may view the death of each individual soldier as an event in its own right.
Because of the separation of thematic relations from the main predicate, (42) The use of a Neo-Davidsonian theory of thematic roles all ows an interesting account of implicit arguments, significantly different from those discussed in Section 2. Parsons (1990) The main effect of this rule is just to suppress the subject thematic role.
By itself, (45) will not give us an existential interpretation for implicit arguments -in fact, it won't give us the effect of an implicit argument at all .
Consider the formula in (44); by itself, this formula will not guarantee that anything killed any of the soldiers; just that they were kill ed. We define an event as atomic with respect to a predicate as in (47): it DDlSt have no proper subevents to which that predicate also app lies.
The reference to atomic events in (46) is crucial; it should not be required that the whole, complex event in which all the soldiers are kill ed must have a single agent, for example. It should be noted that (46) is not something special which we invoke just for passi ves or other cases of implicit arguments; something like this is needed anyway , if only to say which roles the predicate assi gns. It does not in any sense form part of the pass ive rule, which is back in (45); instead, it is part of our chanlcterizati on of the lexical meaning of the verb.
'Ibis approach to implicit arguments provides a way out of our central problem, namely that the existential quantifier associated with an implicit argument must take scope over the universal quantifier assoc iated with a lexically distributive argument -a problem which seems inevitable in either of the approaches outlined in Section 2. In fact, the existential quantifier is DOW guaranteed to be effectively inside the scope of the universal , at least for any predicate subject to a postulate similar to (46) Given an event e and group X such that a'(e) and 82(X, e). the definition in (42) will require a proper su'bevent e' of e such that a( e ') fo r each of the member of X; the larger event e in which the group as a whole participates therefore cann ot be atomic. Because e is not atomic, (48) will not be relevant to detennining if anything bears 81 to it. Regarding the smaller events from which this big one is composed, however, any of these which are atomic will be subj ect to (48); but nothing will require that the different atomic events must bear 81 to the same individual. By limiting the quantification to atomic events in this way , we all ow that The soldiers were kille.d could be true even though the killin g of each individual soldier has its own agent, for example, rather than requiring that there be a single agent for the larger, complex everat of killin g all the soldiers. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, we all ow 1he songs are known to be true even if each song is known by its own child or group of children, without requiring that there be some group which knows all the songs. 6. Coadusion..
To summarize : If we take implicit arguments to be indepeodeJ Jt noun p1uases, they are assigned too wide a scope. If we use rules like (1 1) or (12), whose sellin g point traditionall y bas been that they give narro w scope to the existential quantifier associated with implicit arguments, this quantifier is still assi gned too WIDE a scope with respect to the universal quantification associated with lexically distributive arguments. If, however, we assum e the view of implicit arguments suggested by a neo-Davidsonian decomposition, where implicit arguments are completely unrepresen ted in the logical translation and the existential effect is given in the lexical semantics of the predicate rather than the rule which suppresses the argument, the right scope relations become available.
